Abstract-Several works have recently suggested to model the problem of coordinating the charging needs of a fleet of electric vehicles as a game, and have proposed distributed algorithms to coordinate the vehicles towards a Nash equilibrium of such game. However, Nash equilibria have been shown to posses desirable system-level properties only in simplified cases. In this work, we use the concept of price of anarchy to analyze the inefficiency of Nash equilibria when compared to the social optimum solution. More precisely, we show that i) for linear price functions depending on all the charging instants, the price of anarchy converges to one as the population of vehicles grows; ii) for price functions that depend only on the instantaneous demand, the price of anarchy converges to one if the price function takes the form of a positive pure monomial; iii) for general classes of price functions, the asymptotic price of anarchy can be bounded. For finite populations, we additionaly provide a bound on the price of anarchy as a function of the number vehicles in the system. We support the theoretical findings by means of numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have witnessed a profound change in the way energy systems are operated. A new paradigm called demand response is emerging, according to which the energy requirements of a population of users are tuned, by means of incentives, to account for the operational needs of the power grid [1] . Previous works [2] , [3] have suggested to model these demand response methods as a game. Therein each player represents a user that needs to optimize his energy consumption over a given period of time, with the objective of minimizing his electricity bill. What couples the users, and thus makes the charging problem a game, is the assumption that the energy price depends at every instant of time on the sum of the energy demand of the whole population. The seminal paper [2] shows that the (unique) Nash equilibrium of such game has desirable properties from the standpoint of the grid operator, in the case of large and homogeneous populations. Under these assumptions, [2] shows that the equilibrium is socially optimum in the sense that it minimizes the collective electricity bill (including the cost of both flexible and inflexible demand) and fills the overnight demand valley. As a result, a rich body of literature has focused on devising distributed and decentralized schemes that are numerically efficient, and can be used by the grid operator to coordinate the strategies of the agents to a Nash equilibrium [2] - [7] . Less attention has been devoted to verify whether the optimality statement made in [2] is still valid in the presence of more general cost functions, agents heterogeneity and realistic charging constraints (e.g., upper bounds on the instantaneous charging, different charging windows, ramping constraints). Nonetheless, this is a fundamental prerequisite for the applicability of the aforementioned coordination schemes. 1 Following [2] , the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium has been studied in [8] , under the assumption of linear price functions. Both [2] and [8] focus on simplex constraints and homogeneous populations. The homogeneity assumption is relaxed in [9] , where the authors provide similar efficiency results of those in [2] , but limited to linear price functions and in a probabilistic sense. Non linear price functions are considered in [10] , but the efficiency results pertain to the notion of Wardrop equilibrium and charging constraints are limited to upper bounds. We observe that all the previous works assume that the price at time t depends only on the consumption at the same time instant. Finally, we note that [11] also provides efficiency bounds for charging games, but the setup considered therein is different, in that each agent's decision variable is limited to its starting charging time.
The aim of this paper is to provide efficiency results for the Nash equilibrium of aggregative charging games under different assumptions involving finite populations of vehicles, general convex constraints, non linear price functions and price dependence on different time instants. To do so, we model the charging problem as an aggregative game [12] , and study the equilibrium efficiency using the notion of price of anarchy (PoA). The PoA is a measure introduced in game theory to quantify how much selfish behavior degrades the performance of a given system [13] . By definition, PoA ≥ 1 and the closer to 1 the better the overall performance of the system. The result in [2] can be equivalently stated as the fact that for homogeneous populations with simplex constraints, the PoA converges to 1 as the population size grows. Our main contributions are: 1) We show that the PoA for charging games with linear price function (that might however depend on all charging instants) and generic convex constraints always converges to 1, complementing [2] , [8] - [10] ; 2) For charging games with generic convex constraints and nonnegative price function that depends only on the instantaneous demand, we show that the PoA converges to 1 if the price function is a positive pure monomial (i.e., αz k for some α, k > 0). On the contrary, if the price function does not have this form, it is possible to construct a sequence of games whose PoA does not converge to 1. In such cases, we show how results for routing games [14] , [15] can be used to bound the asymptotic value of the price of anarchy. 3) In all the previous cases we provide an explicit bound connecting the efficiency of the equilibria with the (finite) number of vehicles in the game. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result providing a bound on PoA as a function of the population size, for charging games with general convex constraints and price functions.
Organization: Section II includes the game formulation and some preliminary notions. In Section III we define the efficiency metric used throughout this manuscript, and present the main results for linear and nonlinear price functions. Section IV focuses on the application of charging a fleet of electric vehicles. All the proofs are reported in the Appendix.
Notation: R n ≥0 and R n >0 denote the elements of R n whose components are non negative and positive; 0 n ∈ R n (resp. 1 n ) is the column vector of zero (resp. unit) entries. Given A ∈ R n×n not necessarily symmetric,
Note that the cost J S is the sum of all the players costs, divided by M , and the additional term p(σ(x) + d) d. The reason why the latter term is included is that we want to compute the total cost of buying the commodity both for the flexible (σ(x)) and inflexible (d) users. This cost was first introduced in [2] and then used in [8] - [10] . The inflexible usage level is sometimes modeled in the literature [9] as an additional player with constraint set represented by {x ∈ R n | x = d · M }, where d is the normalized inflexible demand. We do not follow such approach here because we are interested in large populations and this set is unbounded as M → ∞. Throughout the manuscript, we denote with
is continuously differentiable and strongly monotone while
We denote with L S , L p the Lipschitz constant of J S (·), p(·), and with α the monotonicity constant of p(·).
III. PRICE OF ANARCHY FOR FINITE AND LARGE

POPULATIONS
In this section we study the efficiency of equilibria as a function of the population size M . To do so, we consider a sequence of games (G M ) ∞ M =1 of increasing population size. For fixed M , the game G M is played amongst M agents and is defined as in (2) with arbitrary sets
. The function p is instead the same for every game of the sequence. Assumption 2. There exists a convex, compact set
, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. We let R := max y∈X0 ||y||.
For a given a game G M , we quantify the efficiency of equilibrium allocations using the notion of price of anarchy [13] 
where NE M ⊆ X is the set of Nash equilibria of G M and x S is a social optimizer of G M . The price of anarchy captures the ratio between the cost at the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost; by definition PoA M ≥ 1. In the next subsections we study the behavior of PoA M , for three different classes of admissible price functions p (of increasing generality).
A. Linear price function
Throughout this subsection we consider linear price functions p, as detailed in the following.
Note that Assumption 3 implies strong monotonicity of z → p(z + d) and strong convexity of z → p(z + d) (z + d), therefore Assumption 3 is consistent with Assumption 1. It is easy to verify that
, consistently with Assumption 2. Nevertheless, C is not required to be diagonal as it was instead in [8] , [9] .
Theorem 1 (PoA M bound and convergence to 1). a) Under Assumption 1 and 3, for any game G M in the sequence, every Wardrop equilibrium x W is a social optimizer i.e. J S (σ(x W )) ≤ J S (σ(x)), ∀x ∈ X . b) With the further Assumption 2, for any fixed game G M in the sequence it holds that
The proof is reported in the Appendix. Remark 1. The previous theorem extends the results of [2] , [8] - [10] simultaneously allowing for arbitrary convex constraints, finite populations, and non diagonal price function. Note that the condition J S (σ(x S )) >Ĵ ≥ 0 is merely technical and required to properly define PoA M . This condition is trivially satisfied in the applications when, e.g., every agent requests an amount of charge bounded away from zero. Even if the latter condition does not hold, the cost at any Nash equilibrium converges to the minimum cost as M → ∞, see (5).
B. Non linear homogeneous price function
In this section we consider p(z + d) to be a nonlinear function, and assume its t-th component to depend only on the t-th component z t + d t , for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This models, e.g., cases where the unit cost of electricity at every instant of time depends on the total consumption at that same instant.
Assumption 4. The price function p takes the form
Consequently, the game is not potential, [19, Theorem 1.3.1] . Hence methods to bound the PoA based on the existence of an underlying potential function [8] , [9] , can not be used here.
Theorem 2 (PoA M convergence and counterexample). Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold. Further assume that
satisfies the assumptions, but does not take the form αy k for some α > 0 and k > 0, it is possible to construct a sequence of games
The proof is reported in the Appendix. Therein, the counterexample relative to b) is constructed using X i =X . In other words our impossibility result holds also for the case of homogeneous populations. This is not in contrast with the result in [2] or [10] , because therein the setsX were assumed to be simplexes with upper bounds constraints. Here we claim that there exists a convex setX (not a simplex with upper bounds) such that PoA M does not converge to 1.
Remark 2. The previous theorem is of fundamental importance from the standpoint of the system operator, in that it suggests the use of monomial price functions to guarantee the highest achievable efficiency (all Nash equilibria become social optimizers for large M ). If different price functions are chosen, it is always possible to construct a problem instance such that the worst Nash equilibrium is not a social optimizer.
C. Nonlinear heterogeneous price function
In
be non empty, closed and convex. Note that Assumption 5 is less restrictive than Assumption 4 as we let the price l t depend on the time instant t. The key idea in this case is to show that standard results derived in [14] , [15] for Wardrop equilibria in routing games can be applied to charging games too. The resulting bounds on PoA M can then be derived using the converging result in [18] . More formally, given a charging game G M , we consider an equivalent nonatomic routing game over a parallel network with as many links as charging intervals. To present our next result we introduce the following quantity from [15, Eq 3.8]
It follows from [15] 
, where α(L) is the anarchy value for class L as defined in [14] . Therein (see Table 1 ), α(L) is computed for classes of functions such as affine, quadratic, polynomials. The key idea of the following theorem is to show that the games considered here are (1, β(L))-smooth, as defined in [20] . 
contradiction of Theorems 1, 2 because therein either constant functions are not allowed or the price function is assumed to be time independent. Theorems 1, 2 can be seen as refinements of Theorem 3 and guarantee that lim M →∞ PoA M = 1 by restricting the admissible class of price functions.
IV. APPLICATION TO CHARGING OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES
We consider a population of M electric vehicles, where the level of charge of vehicle i at time t is described by s i t . Its evolution is specified by the discrete-time system s , the constraints of agent i reduce to
where
, with s . Such constraints satisfy Assumption 1. Further, we assume that there existŝ η > 0 such that for each M and i ∈ {1, . . . , M }, η i ≤η so that X 0 is compact as required in Assumption 2. Note that this is without loss of generality in any practical scenario. The cost function of each vehicle reads as
where we assumed that the energy price for each time interval p t : R ≥0 → R >0 depends on the ratio between total consumption and total capacity (σ t (x) + d t )/κ t , where d t and σ t (x) :
t are the non-EV and EV demand at time t divided by M and κ t is the total production capacity divided by M as in [2, eq. (6)]. To sum up, we define the game G EV M as in (2), with X i and J i (x i , σ(x)) as in (7) and (8) 
, that is, the overall electricity bill for the sum of non-EV and EV demand; n = 24. For the numerical study, we consider four cases as described next.
Case 1. We set p t (y) = 0.15y For each case, we report the (numerical) price of anarchy as a function of M in Figure 1 (top). Observe that case 1 and 4 feature heterogenous charging needs. For these cases, we have randomly extracted 100 games G EV M (for any fixed M ) and report the worst PoA amongst the 100 realization. In order to plot the price of anarchy, we computed the ratio between one (instead of the worst) Nash equilibrium of G EV M and the social optimum. This choice is imposed by the fact that computing all Nash equilibria of G EV M is in general a hard problem. 2 In Figure 1 (bottom) we plot the difference between the cost at the Nash and at the social optimizer, relative to case 1. Thanks to the choice of parameters and price function, case 1 meets the Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Thus, Theorem 2b) guarantees that lim M →∞ PoA M = 1. The numerical results reported in Figure 1 (top, black line) are consistent with it: the ratio between the cost at the Nash and the cost at the social optimum converges to one. In addition to this, Figure 1 (bottom) shows that also the difference between these costs converges to zero, as guaranteed by the proof of theorem 2a) and the boundedness of X 0 . A typical plot describing the valley filling property of the equilibrium in case 1 can be found e.g., in [2, Figure  2 ]. Case 2 has been constructed so that the corresponding Wardrop equilibrium features the worst possible asymptotic price of anarchy within the class of affine cost functions (for which α(L) = 4/3, see [14] ). The numerics of Figure 1 (top, red line) show that PoA M converges to 1.33 ≈ 4/3 = α(L). Cases 3 and 4 are a modification of case 2. While the presence of base demand (case 3) helps in lowering the price of anarchy, the impact of heterogeneity (case 4) on the asymptotic price of anarchy is minor (blue and green plots in Figure 1 ).
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of charging a fleet of heterogeneous electric vehicles as formulated using game theoretic tools. More precisely, we studied the efficiency of the resulting equilibrium allocations, measured by the concept of price of anarchy. We showed that the price of anarchy converges to one as the population of vehicles grow if the price function is linear (but possibly dependent on all the time instants), or if the price function depends only on the instantaneous demand and is a positive pure monomial. We provided efficiency bounds for general non linear functions. For these three cases, we also provided bounds on the PoA as a function of the population size. Our theoretical findings are corroborated by means of numerical simulations. We conclude noting that the question regarding the efficiency of equilibria in aggregative games is of interest for a broader class of cost functions than those studied here (e.g., quasi convex costs). We leave this as a future work.
APPENDIX A: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE AVERAGE This section characterizes the average players' action σ(x) at the Wardrop equilibrium and at the social optimizer of G.
Definition 4 (Variational inequality [19] ). Given K ⊆ R and
Lemma 1 (Equivalent characterizations).
Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
Then any vector of strategies x S ∈ X S is a social optimizer.
Proof: 1) The sets X i are convex and closed by Assumption 1; further, for fixed z ∈ Σ, the functions J i (x i , z) are linear and thus convex in x i ∈ X i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , M }. It follows that (see [18] ) a Wardrop equilibrium x W satisfies
(9) Rearranging and dividing by M we get p(σ(
is strongly monotone and Σ is closed, convex (since the sets X i are closed, convex), hence by [19] VI(Σ, F W ) has a unique solution σ W . By definition of variational inequality, for any z ∈ Σ it holds p(σ
By definition of Σ, we conclude that (9) holds for all x ∈ X . Thus, x W is a Wardrop equilibrium (see [18] ). 2) By Assumption 1, the set X is convex and closed and J S (σ(x)) is convex. Hence, a social optimizer x S satisfies
The remaining claims are proven similarly to 1).
APPENDIX B: PROOFS OF THEOREM 1, 2 AND 3
Proof of Theorem 1 a) Let x W be a Wardrop equilibrium. By Lemma 1 part 1,
Since the two operators F W (z) and F S (z) are parallel for each z ∈ Σ, it follows from the definition of variational inequality that σ(x W ) must solve VI(Σ, F S ) too. Using Lemma 1 part 2 we conclude that x W must be a social optimizer. b) By definition J S (σ(x S )) ≤ J S (σ(x N )) and so 1 ≤ PoA M . Further, Assumption 2 and the strong monotonicity of p(z +d) (Assumption 1) allow us to use the convergence result of [18, Theorem 1] . That is, for any Nash equilibrium x N and Wardrop equilibrium x W of the game
Since every Wardrop equilibrium is socially optimum (previous point of this proof), one has
The final result regarding the price of anarchy follows from the latter inequality upon dividing both sides by J S (σ(x S )) >Ĵ ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 2 a) We first show that any Wardrop equilibrium is a social optimizer. To do so, observe that the function f (y) = αy k satisfies all the assumptions required by Lemma 1 (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix). Let x W be a Wardrop equilibrium of G M . By Lemma 1, σ(x W ) solves VI(Σ, F W ). Thanks to Assumption 4 and the choice of f (y),
Hence σ(x W ) solves VI(Σ, F S ) too. Using Lemma 1 we conclude that x W must be a social optimizer. The proof is now identical to the proof of Theorem 1, part b). b) If f (y) does not take the form αy k for some α > 0 and k > 0, by Lemma 2 there exists a pointz ∈ R n >0 for which F W (z) and F S (z) are not aligned, i.e. for which F S (z) = hF W (z) for all h ∈ R. We intend to construct a sequence of games G M so that for every G M in the sequence the unique average at the Wardrop equilibrium is exactlyz, that isz solves VI(Σ, F W ), butz does not solve VI(Σ, F S ). This fact indeed proves, by Lemma 1, that for any game G M the Wardrop equilibria of G M are not social minimizers. Since σ(x N ) → σ(x W ) as M → ∞ [18, Theorem 1], one concludes that PoA cannot converge to 1.
In the following we construct a sequence of games with the above mentioned properties. To this end let us define Figure 2 . The intuition is that −v 2 is the component ofF S that lives in the same plane asF S andF W and is orthogonal toF W , so thatF W v 2 = 0. Observe that Σ =X is the intersection of a bounded and convex set with the positive orthant and thus satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. It is easy to verify thatz ∈X and that F W (z) (z −z) = α||F W (z)|| 2 ≥ 0 for all z ∈ Σ =X , so that z solves VI(Σ, F W ). Let us pickẑ =z + βv 2 . Note that sincē z > 0, for β small enoughẑ belongs to R n >0 as well and thus tō
The inequality is strict becauseF W ,F S are neither parallel nor zero (Lemma 2). Thus,z does not solve VI(Σ, F S ).
Lemma 2. For n ≥ 2, if f (y) satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 and 4, but does not take the form αy k for some α > 0 and k > 0,
Proof: Let us consider the first statement. By contradiction, assume there exists β(z) :
. This implies f (z t + d t )(z t + d t ) = (β(z 1 , . . . , z n ) − 1)f (z t + d t ) , (11) for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all z ∈ R n >0 , d ∈ R n >0 . By Assumption 4, f (z t + d t ) > 0. Hence one can divide (11) for f (z t + d t ) without loss of generality, and conclude that β(z 1 , . . . , z n ) = β 1 (z 1 ) = · · · = β n (z n ) with β i : R → R for all z ∈ R n >0 . For n ≥ 2 the last condition implies β(z 1 , . . . , z n ) = b constant. Equation ( Proof: Note that ∇ z p(z + d) is a diagonal matrix with entry f (z t + d t ) in position (t, t). Since f (y) = αky k−1 > 0 for all y > 0 and since z t +d t is positive by assumption for all t, we get that p(z + d) is continuously differentiable and that ∇ z p(z + d) 0 i.e. that z → p(z + d) is strongly monotone. Similarly, one can show that the Hessian of p(z + d) (z + d) and the Hessian of J i (x i , σ(x)) with respect to x i are positive definite. Thus, z → p(z + d) (z + d) and x i → J i (x i , σ(x)) are strongly convex. See [21] for further details.
Proof of Theorem 3
We prove only a) as b) can be shown as in Theorem 1b). We define C σ1 (σ 2 ) := p(σ 1 +d) (σ 2 +d) so that J S (σ) = C σ (σ). Let x W be any Wardrop equilibrium. Then, the averageσ := σ W solves VI(Σ, F W ) i.e. F W (σ) (σ −σ) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ. This can be seen following the proof of Lemma 1 part 1), and observing that only convexity and closedness of X i are required. Equivalently, J S (σ) ≤ Cσ(σ), ∀σ ∈ Σ. However, Cσ(σ) = t l t (σ t + d t )(σ t + d t ) = J S (σ) + t [l t (σ t + d t ) − l t (σ t + d t )](σ t + d t ) = J S (σ) + t [lt(vt)−lt(wt)]wt lt(vt)vt l t (v t )v t ≤ J S (σ) + t β(L)l t (v t )v t = J S (σ) + β(L)J S (σ) where we use v t :=σ t + d t ≥ d t , w t := σ t + d t ≥ d t and d t ≥ 0. The previous relation holds for all σ ∈ Σ. Selecting σ = σ S (the optimum average), we get J S (σ) ≤ J S (σ S )+β(L)J S (σ).
Rearranging we obtain (6) .
